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THE ALLIANCE AGAINST DISARMAMENT: THE
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
Mary D. Wammack
The Division of Biology and Medicine recognizes that it is not its function
to set standards for the military nor to impede the operations of the
Department of Defense.
Shields Warren, 1951
Division Director, Atomic Energy Commission
It is the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Forces
Policy Council that dealing with arms regulation in advance of the settlement of the major political issues
is unrealistic and contrary to the best interests of
our national security.
Memorandum for the President, 1955

Of the discussions that took place at the highest policy levels during the administration of
Dwight D. Eisenhower, those concerning the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the arms race
with the Soviet Union were among the most urgent and, perhaps, the most consequential in their
failure.

In the United States, members of the Eisenhower cabinet and other agencies and

departments analyzed and addressed the consequences of various diplomatic proposals.
Throughout that assessment phase, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Atomic Energy Commission joined in steadfast opposition to arms limitations. On the
international plane, the United Nations and allies of each country, fearing the worst, urged
compromise. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately rejected every
possible diplomatic solution over the issue of verifiability, arguing that any procedure to monitor
compliance would violate their respective national security. Rhetorical sparring and enmity
grew as the international community brought ever more pressure to bear upon the two
superpowers and confrontation seemed ever more likely. As a result, efforts to limit the arms
race between the United States and the Soviet Union actually led to an escalation of weapons
development and experimentation. The costs of that escalation were enormous—in terms of
budgets and lives: the development and display of atomic and particularly hydrogen weapons by
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both nations resulted in radioactive material contaminating, in the form of fallout, every region
of the globe.
From this fact emerge the two interrelated questions that drive this study: what were the
factors that contributed to the diplomatic failures of 1950s arms limitation talks between the
United States and the Soviet Union? and, how did those failures affect the development and
experimentation of atomic weaponry? This essay narrows those broad issues and addresses both
questions from a domestic viewpoint, illustrating how the increased militarization of post World
War II America affected domestic relationships between military branches, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and US citizens; and, how that same militarization ultimately influenced foreign
policy during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. With reference to the existing
literature, selected (and declassified) records of the Atomic Energy Commission, minutes and
documents of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other
contemporary sources, I argue that it was the formation of a partnership between the military and
Atomic Energy Commission—a civilian board established by Congress designed, under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, to limit military influence—that shaped the direction of weapons
development and thwarted efforts to breach the diplomatic impasse over arms limitation and
reduction.
A brief overview of the underlying assumptions of this analysis and a contextual
summary of the postwar period establish the boundaries of this examination. Section II reviews
how the military persuaded the AEC to recommend a continental test site in 1950 and how a
receptive NSC garnered presidential approval. Section III examines the consequences of that
decision to illustrate the ways that the AEC's accommodation to militarism increased the risks
inherent in the testing of atomic weapons. Finally, since disarmament threatened the structure of
the 1950s militarized state, Section IV addresses that issue and the obvious contradictions in
what one UN attaché considered “the basic inconsistency between simultaneous armament and
discussion of disarmament.”1
I.

1

Assumptions

“Minutes of Meeting with the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament at the Department of State, April 28, 1952”
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. II, National Security Affairs, 905. William Sanders, United States Army, attended the
meeting as one of the contingent representing the Department of State.
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Compensatory legislation provides ample evidence that the cold war atomic arms race
injured and killed countless unwary Americans. Apologetic but unrepentant, Congress has
repeatedly reminded the victims that their suffering, while unfortunate, was unavoidable. This
essay proposes an alternative: That atomic weapons development was crucial to the nation’s
security during the cold war, but the program—had it heeded the concerns of its own health
experts—could have been a relatively safe one.2 It will be assumed here, as it undeniably was
then, that as a totalitarian state with atomic weapons in its arsenal, the Soviet Union and Sovietstyle communism posed a very real threat to the United States, to its interests and allies, and to
weak nation-states. Within such a context, atomic weaponry was essential. Militarization of the
AEC, however, was not. Military initiatives, and supporters of those initiatives within the AEC,
made atomic development more hazardous than it needed to be. As has been the case with
historical critiques of the excesses of McCarthyism, flurries of covert operations, Vietnam, and
other features of the cold war, the character and intensity of the nation’s atomic weapons
program deserves renewed scrutiny.
The atomic weapons complex was uniquely posed when the nation shifted into the cold
war culture in 1949/1950. Because the Army’s Manhattan Project had relied primarily upon
private industry, the military and independent scientific laboratories and advisors entered the
cold war already fortified by mutually-dependent institutional bonds.3
2

Yet, as an

The historical record shows that expert advice regarding health hazards was haphazardly applied—gaining
currency primarily when the advice coincided with the military’s definition of necessity. Examining the devastation
that remained scattered about the desert after “Trinity,” the Manhattan Project’s chief health physicist, Stafford
Warren, reported that the fallout hazard extended for more than 90 miles, and that no other test of “Trinity’s”
magnitude should ever be attempted unless performed in an aread that was free of population for at least 150 miles.
“Report on Test 16 July 1945” Warren to Groves, 21 July, 1945, Top Secret Correspondence of the Manhattan
Engineer District, [TSCMED]. Later, as Chief Medical Officer for Operation Crossroads, Warren reiterated that
fallout was the most dangerous, and fickle, product of atomic weapons testing and that Bikini, since already ruined,
should be the only place that such tests were held. Warren to Admiral Parsons, 18 January 1947, Warren MSS, box
77. The government refused to allow Warren to publish the results of his findings on fallout, and his analysis of the
lethality of fallout “hot spots.” Warren to Viola Warren, 14 June 1947, Warren MSS, box 1. Despite evidence from
1948 tests at Eniwetok that found fallout from low-level atomic weapons prohibitively dangerous within a radius of
300 miles, the AEC considered the Nevada Test Site an acceptable location. In 1949, Shields Warren—head of the
AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine, warned of long-term consequences of strontium 90 atmospheric
contamination, and in 1951 objected to the detonation of bombs from towers because of the increased amounts of
fallout produced and also to the Army’s decision to test the mettle of their soldiers and the effects of radiation upon
them by stationing troops dangerous close to atomic detonations. See p. 12, f.
3
A veritable “who’s who” of powerful corporations: Monsanto, Du Pont, General Electric, United Fruit Company.
Ernest O. Lawrence, founder of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories and the University of California, Berkeley,
Radiation Laboratory was especially adept ingratiating himself to representatives from both ends of the spectrum.
He maintained military ties formed during his association with the Manhattan Project while courting the liberal and
reformist David E. Lilienthal, first chairman of the AEC. During the 1950s, Lawrence joined with arch
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underappreciated model for the Eisenhower era military/industrial complex, the ulterior
motivations and behaviors that parallel the stated purpose of those types of relationships have
been, in the case of atomic development, little explored.4 Many historians have been content
with interpretations that either rationalize the entire atomic weapons endeavor as required
(sometimes at any cost); or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, condemn the entire atomic
weapons project as unnecessary and illegitimate.5
The reasoning that characterizes these histories is benignly anchored to the peculiar
circumstances of the era in general and atomic testing in particular, and a review may help
explain not only the thinking of historians, but also provide some clues as to why such a
dangerous enterprise was not more fully critiqued at the time. The most cogent explanation is
that the secrecy associated with atomic science precluded its intricacies from becoming part of
the public discourse at the time and for the duration of the cold war; also, the AEC’s
legislatively-mandated civilian stewardship and operational secrecy drew attention away from its
early-1950s altered character.

Additionally, in a cultural context, Eisenhower himself

compartmentalized the issue when he introduced public/private partnerships and nuclearism into
the national conversation. His commitment to garner support for nuclear armament through the
psychological mobilization of the American public resulted in what historian H.W. Brands has
termed “nuclear nationalism.”6 The capstone to this rhetorical bombardment was Eisenhower’s
1961 farewell address. Evidencing, perhaps, that he had come to believe his strategy altogether
too persuasive and effective, Eisenhower spoke of the “unwarranted influence [of the]
conservatives to oppose any discussion of disarmament. Passim, microfilm reels 17, 49. Papers of Ernest O.
Lawrence, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. [EOL]
4
Notable exceptions include, for wartime alliances, Ronald Powaski, March to Armageddon (New York; London:
Oxford University Press, 1987) and Martin J. Sherwin’s poignant, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins
of the Arms Race (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); for the post-war period in general, see Gregg Herkin, The
Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War (New York: Knopf, 1980); and, for a study of the cold war in
particular, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 1983).
The co-option of science by government had influences on the accumulation and organization of knowledge that
have outlasted the original purposes of that alliance. Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The
Military-Industrial Complex at MIT and Stanford, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 9-12.
5
Polarized perspectives are available for the Hanford plant: Michael D’Antonio, Atomic Harvest (New York, NY:
Crown Publishers, 1993) stands in sharp contrast to the “worth any cost” perspective of Michele Stenshjem Berber’s
On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska
Press, 1992). See also Valerie Kuletz, The Tainted Desert: Environmental and Social Ruin in the American West
(New York: Routledge, 1998); Stewart L. Udall, The Myths of August (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994); Leslie J.
Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982); John Fuller, The Day We
Bombed Utah, (New York: New American Library, 1984); Hilgartner, Bell, O’Connor, Nukespeak, Nuclear
Language, Visions and Mindset (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1982).
6
H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 71-72.
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military/industrial” complex and warned of dire consequences should that hydra-headed entity
seize additional levers of power. Finally, to this cognitive terrain must also be added the
temporal barriers and dramatic events that help shape public and historical understanding even as
they may obscure or overshadow ideological and institutional continuities.
By focusing on such continuities, this essay will suggest that domestic realities—the
militarization of the AEC and the backing it garnered from the National Security Council—
played more of a role in setting the trajectory for atomic weapons development in the 1950s than
either presidential policies or international events. Though civilians ostensibly governed the
AEC throughout its history, the military assumed tacit control of the Commission in 1950 when
supporters of civilian control (particularly AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal) were
overwhelmed with the decision to develop hydrogen weapons.7 Despite the AEC’s shift in
purpose, the military’s complete domination of the AEC may not have been possible without a
corresponding transformation of ideology within the National Security Council.8
Only reluctantly endorsed by Truman, the protocol known as NSC 68 transformed the
post-war policy that had emphasized political containment of communism to one that relied upon
military containment.9 The ideological underpinnings of NSC 68 and its reliance upon extensive
military mobilization were not abandoned with Eisenhower’s administration; rather, NSC 68
became the model, refined and incorporated into subsequent policy directives.10 This alignment
of the two bulwarks of the cold war American state gave the AEC a nearly-limitless and
unregulated ability to initiate weapons development, pursue testing schemes continentally and in
the Pacific, and rationalize the expansion of classification systems.

The result was a

constitutionally- debilitating ensemble of maneuvers whereby the AEC evaded congressional,
and even presidential, oversight.

7

Mary D. Wammack, Chain Reaction: The Tragedy of Atomic Governance, MA Thesis, UNLV, 1999.
Michael J. Hogan has elegantly assessed post-war militarization and the institutionalization of permanent
mobilization through the National Security Council in A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the
National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
9
For NSC 68, see Ernest R. May, ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: St. Martin’s
Press, 1993).
10
See, for example, the March 10, 1953 memorandum from the Roger Keyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding input on a review of policy procedures, NSC 730-c, to bear in mind “currently
approved national security policies, objectives or commitments.” [page unnumbered] Documents of the National
Security Council, Eighth Supplement, [DNSC] Thus did reviews of national security policy become little more than
mechanisms to supplement, and increase, existing levels.
8
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II.

Atomic energy vs. Atomic bombs: The militarization of the Atomic Energy Commission

‘In the long run,’ as Lord Keynes once pointed out quite reasonably, ‘we
shall all be dead.’ The opinion was voiced in more hopeful times. It now seems
likely that the run for most of us may be considerably shortened.
James Newman, 1951. 11
The government tested atomic weapons in Nevada from 1951 until the United States and
the Soviet Union entered into an unofficial testing moratorium on atmospheric weapons in 1958.
The National Security Council convinced President Truman that continental testing was
necessary, and that Nevada—and not the Pacific Proving Ground—was the most suitable site for
such tests. Although the Korean War is most often cited as the reason for an accelerated testing
schedule and a convenient “backyard” facility, that argument relies too heavily upon the
beneficiaries’ own rationale and not enough on the sequence of events that led to the decision. In
fact, after the 1946 Atomic Energy Act stripped the military of its unilateral control over atomic
science, the Army, envious of the atomic largesse that the Navy enjoyed at the nation’s Pacific
Proving Grounds, asked repeatedly for a continental weapons testing facility. The Korean War
was influential only insofar as it was the ultimate justification for a $214 billion military
mobilization—a windfall that eased intraservice rivalries and led to the formation of a military
coalition.12

The military gained control over atomic science because it was opportunistic, not

because it was needy. The ways that the AEC's subordination affected atomic weapons testing
is the focus of this section, but a brief summary of the events leading up to that transformation
will provide a useful introduction.
In 1947 Congress, recognizing the need for a coordinated and fiscally-viable approach to
post-war defense, passed the National Security Act. The Act created the Department of Defense
(DOD), the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president on all foreign or domestic
matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to represent the armed forces and provide military advice,
and the Central Intelligence Agency.13

As an alternative to his failed military unification

scheme, Truman hoped the bill would coordinate national purpose and reduce costly interservice rivalries. George Marshall, Truman’s secretary of state, was one of the most prescient of
11

James Newman, “Review of The Hell Bomb” The New Republic, January 22, 1951, 29.
By contrast, the 1951 expenses for Korea were estimated at $13 billion. Hogan, Cross, 309. For additional
support of this argument, see Wammack, 226-233.

12
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the Act’s opponents. Marshall feared that the Act gave the military too much influence: The
armed forces would become too influential in directing the president’s foreign policy choices,
would undermine the importance of the secretary of state’s diplomatic efforts, and would receive
unwarranted control over non-military, national assets.14

The military coalition that Marshall

prophesied failed to emerge during his term as secretary of state. Post-war budget cutbacks left
the branches at each others’ throats, and the NSC became little more than a forum for the armed
forces to engage in “open political warfare.”15
In 1948 Dean Acheson, Marshall’s successor, addressed a clamorous ensemble of
domestic and international discontents with fresh ideas. The Berlin Crisis was in its seventh
month and the NATO treaty was still unsettled. Before he had completed a year in office, the
Soviet Union had tested its first atomic weapon and China had fallen to the communists.
Domestically, the House Unamerican Activity Committee's attack on the Truman administration
picked up steam with the denouncement of Alger Hiss, an Acheson friend and brother of
Acheson’s protégé Donald Hiss.
Fear of communism – real and imagined, at home and abroad – permeated American
society, politics, and science. With his administration under domestic political attack and the
seeming international failure of America and its allies to control the spread of communism,
Truman considered alternatives to the “political containment” policy endorsed by Marshall.
Acheson promoted the recommendations of Paul Nitze, his newly-appointed head of policy
planning.

The result was NSC 68, a now-legendary document that brought together the

ideological foundations and the strategic initiatives that characterized the cold war. Because the
massive military build-up envisioned in NSC 68 required an equally massive budget, Truman
and fiscally-conservative insiders resisted the adoption of that policy.16 The “logjam” broke free

13

National Security act of 1947, US Congress, US Statues at Large, 80th Congress, 1st sess., 1947, vol. 61.
Hogan, Cross, 56-57. Later, as Secretary of Defense, Marshall announced he would restrain the military’s
influence over national security. During a June 27 meeting of the National Security Council, Marshall announced
that he would abide by the statutory requirement to relay JCS recommendations, he was under no burden to agree
with them and would state his own opinion at meetings. As to recommendations from the secretaries of the
branches, Marshall would consider them a factor only in his own, personal, deliberations depending upon their
“importance.” “Minutes of the 95th Meeting of the National Security Council” Wednesday, June 27, 1951. Minutes
of the National Security Council, Third Supplement, [MNSC]
15
Charles E. Neu, “The Rise of the National Security Bureaucracy”, The New American State, Louis Galambos, ed.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 88.
16
An insightful critique of NSC 68 that includes a compelling discussion of its detractors is Robert P. Newman,
“NSC (National Insecurity) 68: Nitze’s Second Hallucination,” Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking
14
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with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950 and Truman approved NSC 68 in December
1950. It “subverted Truman’s attempt to recapture the [budget] initiative. . . side-tracked the
president’s initial strategy of deterrence. ” As Michael Hogan elegantly summarizes, “national
security became the common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most values, the key
to America’s new identity.”17
These events accommodated the military’s plans to reclaim authority over atomic
science. The Army had fought for continued military control at the end of the war, and after the
passage of the civilian-oriented Atomic Energy Act, argued unceasingly that making it
dependent upon the AEC’s outspoken champion of civilian control, Chairman David E.
Lilienthal, threatened national security.18 Truman consistently backed Lilienthal, rebuffing all
appeals, including those from the military’s congressional allies, for military custody of the
bomb.
The following selected history of the post-war arguments for custodianship, while
reflective of the military’s long-standing disregard for the hazards of weapons experimentation,
demonstrates that AEC leadership was the key to military control. The Army, envious of the
Navy since 1946 and weapons tests in the Pacific, began in 1947 to lobby for a continental test
site where it could experiment with lower yield tactical weapons and troops. In their request, the
Army refused to consider the hazards its proposal posed, insisting that the sooner Americans
became accustomed to “the possibility of an atomic explosion within a matter of 100 or so miles
of their homes” the better.19 The AEC refused that 1947 request, and the Army renewed it in
1948. Again, the AEC refused, citing “unresolved questions concerning off-site hazards to the
United States Public.”20 Ever tenacious, the military argued in 1949 that it required a continental
test in advance of the already-planned Pacific Greenhouse Series. Yet again, the AEC based its
refusal on health and safety considerations. The AEC’s grasp on civilian oversight finally did

Rhetoric and History, Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands, eds. (College Station TX: Texas A&M University
Press, 2000) 55-94.
17
Hogan, 304, 313.
18
The best summaries of the Army’s official requests, and their unofficial lobbying of conservative members of
congress are in Lilienthal’s diary entries. David E. Lilienthal, The Diaries of David E. Lilienthal (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964) 121-123, 217-219, 233-234, 348-351, 373-377. Stuart Symington had been campaigning for
the Air Force, boasting in an early 1949 speech about the B-36s capacity for atomic bombs.
19
Memorandum to Army Chief of Staff from Commanding Lieutenant General Hull, cited in International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research,
Radioactive Heaven and Earth, (New York: The Apex Press , 1991) 53.
20
Committee on Operational Future, Nevada Proving Ground, “Summary of Minutes” January 14, 1953.
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disintegrate in 1950 when Lilienthal resigned after Truman decided, against the AEC’s majority
recommendation, to authorize the H-Bomb’s development.21
The ramifications of Truman’s decision, based upon his belief that the Soviets were
capable of developing “the Super,” extended beyond Lilienthal’s resignation, the expenditure of
resources and talent, and the eventual successful creation of hydrogen weapons.

The two

commissioners who had disagreed with the majority AEC opinion against hydrogen
development, Gordon Dean and Lewis Strauss, did so with the backing of conservative members
of congress who, preferring military trusteeship, had not only battled Lilienthal throughout his
tenure, but had been highly critical of Truman and his policies.22 Dean would succeed Lilienthal
as chairman of the AEC and Strauss succeeded Dean.23 Together, the two men retained control
of the AEC throughout the period of atmospheric testing.
A new direction at the highest levels of government and Dean’s ascendancy to AEC
chairman gave the JCS an opportunity to win its long-fought war for the atom. In 1950 the AEC
shifted resources into weapons development and asked the NSC to recommend a continental
testing site. President Truman created the Nevada Test Site on December 18, 1950; and, because
the NSC assured him the site would be used only for a “few relatively low-order detonations on
an emergency basis,” did so before the Army Corps of Engineers had completed studies on
radiological factors.24 Six weeks later, “Able” caused doors to slam in nearby Las Vegas, and
four more detonations followed within two weeks. By the time Truman left office, twelve atom
bombs exploded in the Nevada desert, and three of those were equivalent to, or greater than, the
21 KT weapon dropped on Nagasaki.

21

Truman made his decision against the recommendation of all but two members of the AEC and the General
Advisory Council.
22
Lilienthal opposed Dean’s appointment to the commission. When Truman asked for his opinion, Lilienthal told
him that he thought Gordon Dean’s “chief qualification was that Brien McMahon had sponsored him two years ago
and was pressing hard to get him appointed how.” At that time, McMahon was one of Truman’s harshest critics.
Lilienthal, 472.
23
Although Roger M. Anders, Historian with the US Department of Energy, argues in “The Atomic Bomb and the
Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control” that Dean championed civilian control because he
resisted the wholesale turnover of weapons to the JCS, his tacit cooperation with the military regarding continental
weapons testing, Pacific hydrogen testing, and the diversion of resources intended for civilian appropriation of
atomic science, tells a different story. Military Affairs, 52:1 (Jan., 1988) 1-6
24
Jeff Adler, “A-Bomb Testing Posed No Dangers” Las Vegas Sun, December 18, 1978. 1, 4.
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III.

Camp Desert Rock

Incidentally, for reasons which I am not quire clear on myself, we
changed the name of this place to Nevada Proving Ground.
Carroll L. Tyler, Test Director, Tumbler-Snapper Series,
to members of the press invited to witness
an atomic weapons test.25
Tyler’s comment to reporters regarding the site’s changed name reflected a profound
change in its identity and purpose. From the relatively-innocent place that the NSC convinced
Truman it would be—a place for scientists to test bomb components before full-scale
experimentation in the Pacific—to a “proving ground”— an area set aside solely for bombs and
weapons testing, not unlike the Nevada Proving Ground that had donated a portion of its facility
to the AEC, or Utah’s Dugway Proving Ground. The address, submitted to the AEC for
approval along with briefing scripts from other speakers, was designed to introduce the press to
his role in an upcoming 1952 weapons test. Few Americans at the time would have been
unaware of the term “proving ground” and by mentioning it amidst a summary of his duties as
test director, Graves staked out the military’s claim to the AEC facility—symbolically plunging
an Army standard into the rocky ground of Camp Mercury. 26
The military’s appropriation of the AEC to its own ends resulted in the diversion of funds
that had been earmarked for peaceful uses—medical research, university fellowships, atomic
energy—to weapons development.

Because bombs and tactical weapons depleted material

resources, the expansion required additional sources and contracts for ore, factories, and
refineries. The AEC “mobilized” universities and research centers and its contractors employed
tens of thousands in jobs from uranium mining to precision electrical instrumentation. More
important for the purpose of this essay, however, is that the military sacrificed health and safety
concerns of troops and civilians to its two main goals: the development and perfection of
25

“AEC Information Plan and Materials for Shot 3, Tumbler-Snapper Test Series” April 15, 1952, 11. AEC 505/25
Defendant’s Exhibit DX 21949, Prescott v. US.
26
Though scientists cooperated with the military in encouraging the AEC to construct a continental testing facility,
Drs. Norris E. Bradbury and Darol Froman from Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory argued in 1953 that the
military’s occupation threatened scientific utilization. Bradbury complained, “I regard the tendency to use the NPG
for the purpose of weapons system tests, for civil defense effects tests, for troop indoctrination and maneuvers, and
for the reportorial press as quite outside the original concept of this site. Indeed this trend, if continued, can force us
to abandon this site for no other reason than that the military have taken it over.” “Summary of Minutes, Committee
on Operational Future, NPG” Santa Fe Operations Office [SFOO] January 14, 1953.
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weapons and training personnel for atomic warfare. By cooperating with the military, the AEC
also began practices that subordinated health and safety concerns and, when not completely
oblivious to the issue, marginalized its own Division of Biology and Medicine, finding ways to
avoid rather than address safety issues.
Two examples, one from Lilienthal and one from Dean, illustrate the striking difference
in emphasis that militarism made to Dean’s regime. In response to a military request for the
expansion of weapon facilities in July 1949—and a “whopper” at that—Lilienthal sought
information regarding the consequences of fallout from atomic bombs. How many bombs might
it take to “contaminate the atmosphere? . . .Stafford Warren and others put [the number] very
low. . .E.O. Lawrence and his people think this is rot.” Both men Lilienthal consulted had
potential biases: Warren, Dean of UCLA medical school, had resigned his Naval commission in
disgust over the Navy’s nonchalance about the hazards of fallout. He based his opinion on
extensive experience with atom bombs. He had been the chief medical officer on the Manhattan
Project, had directed the establishment of survivor studies in Japan, and, while managing the
scientific and medical teams during the Navy’s 1946 Pacific testing, had dealt with frightening
levels of fallout. Lawrence, on the other hand, may have had a number of reasons to minimize
the danger, but one in particular is unavoidable—as founder and owner of Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, any decision to increase the nation’s stockpile could only help his bottom line.
Lilienthal requested an additional, independent, report. It disagreed with Lawrence’s opinion.
Even then, Lilienthal remained wary: “We must try to get a reasonable answer.”27
During Dean’s tenure as chairman, he subordinated safety to military demands and
employed public relations schemes to manipulate public opinion and legitimize the
subordination. In an AEC meeting held on May, 1952, after the second year of weapons testing
in Nevada, Shields Warren of the Division of Biology and Medicine warned of dangerous levels
of fallout resulting from tower detonation of moderate yield devices. The minutes reflect that
Warren told the commission that it should be “careful in the future to avoid tests when the winds
in the upper air reach high velocities. . . . the Tower Shot [“Easy”- 12 kt] reinforced his
conclusion that we cannot risk any [larger] continental shots.” In response, Dean could have
cancelled tests pending further study or gone on record as supporting the decisions of the

27

Lilienthal, 553. Though beyond the scope of this analysis, the difficulty Lilienthal faced in finding objective
assessments of the dangers of radioactivity were only magnified by the insular culture of cold war science.
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military regardless of the risks. Or, he could have recommended an approach that balanced
military needs with off-site safety by limiting the size of tower shots and recommending that test
managers consider the cancellation of tests to reduce off-site fallout.28 Instead, he sidestepped
the safety issue altogether, suggesting that “a popular article on fall-out to reduce the possibility
of public anxiety. . .might be helpful.”29
Though only a rough beginning to the public relations campaigns that the AEC would
develop to protect the military, Dean’s comments came after a short but powerful burst of energy
by the military that had already totally undermined the authority of the AEC and the Division of
Biology and Medicine to regulate the terms of troop exposure.30 In 1949, in preparation for the
Army’s plan to introduce and attempt to accustom troops to radioactive fallout, Warren contacted
Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton of the University of California, Berkeley’s Crocker Laboratory and
provided him with all available information to launch a thorough appraisal of the problem.
Hamilton determined that troops might remain operational if not psychologically disturbed, but
noted that the root issue was internal radioactive poisoning from inhalation. Recommending
more experimentation to determine, with precision, the exact strata of safe to dangerous levels,
Hamilton recommended that no such maneuvers be attempted until lengthy experiments had
been performed using “large monkeys such as chimpanzees,” warning that the AEC could

28
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otherwise be accused of recklessly endangering human lives, “a little of the Buchenwald
touch.”31
The combined efforts of Warren and Hamilton mattered little to the Army which insisted
that its soldiers needed realistic training. When the military requested permission in October
1951 to over-expose troops by stationing them within one mile of ground zero, Warren told the
AEC to refuse the request. Rather than confront the Army itself, the commission decided to turn
the matter over to test director, Carroll Tyler. Warren contacted Tyler to warn him that
overexposures of servicemen were unacceptable and that Tyler himself—and not the Army—
would have to explain any non-emergency instances. Warren suggested that Tyler encourage the
Army to comply by employing a little “ingenuity” rather than needlessly risk lives. Warren
believed a seven-mile limit would give troops enough realism without endangering them, but
Tyler granted the Army permission to deploy at five and one-half miles.32 Despite what must
have been his obvious frustration, Warren’s October recommendation demonstrated the
deference he and the AEC accorded the military: “The Division of Biology and Medicine
recognizes that it is not its function to set standards for the military nor to impede the operations
of the Department of Defense.”

Yet, even Warren could not resist pointing out that the

Commission was the only responsible entity—“both in fact and in the public mind.”33 With the
development and military appropriation of the continental test site, the armed forces impeded the
statutory responsibilities of the AEC by insinuating themselves between the public and the only
possible guardian of public health issues related to atomic testing.
By the mid-1950s, the AEC and the military could no longer completely cloak their
arrogant and reckless behavior. The development and detonation of hydrogen weapons by both
the US and the USSR made fallout an issue of increasingly important international concern, and
the AEC, unable to monopolize the flow of fallout-related information, found itself on the
defensive from above and below. Disturbing details emerged from reports issued regarding
fallout, including those from the genetic-effects studies of Japanese children, the United Nations
31
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Commission on Fallout, the National Academy of Sciences, and a host of independent scientists
unassociated with the US atomic program.34 Public opinion had shifted so decisively after
fallout showered a Japanese fishing vessel that even AEC commissioners became confused. In
May 1954, President Eisenhower “reconstituted” a special committee of the NSC to “consider
the question of possible suspension of thermonuclear weapons test operations.”35 Then, at an
August AEC meeting, Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, having no idea of the outcome of the
president’s action and despite the fact that thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons were not tested in
Nevada, asked whether the NSC had decided to “discontinue the use of the Nevada Proving
Grounds.” Being assured that it had not, Murray joined the committee in approving the 1955
testing series.36 The president’s action, together with the enormous publicity that fallout had
received, altered the AEC’s statutory routine of asking the president for permission to expend
radioactive material for tests. Instead of the usual simple listing of the types of tests requested by
various agencies (DOD, Federal Civil Defense Administration) Chairman Strauss inserted a
paragraph informing the president that the 1955 tests would be of “small enough energy yield
and fired under such conditions as to reduce hazard to the public to a minimum.” Strauss’s
reference to a reduced hazard evidences the fact that information formally secreted within the
AEC’s insular bureaucracy—that fallout posed risks—was no longer secret. Unable to rely upon
its long-standing denial that fallout posed any off-site hazard, the chairman’s request alluded,
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instead, to the testing series as one necessary for the national defense, and thus worth some
hazard.37
During this time, concerned Americans clung to the solace provided by well-known
public personalities in the atomic field and public and private universities—most rather quietly
associated with private laboratories—that fallout really was nothing to worry about.
Unfortunately, most of this comforting flurry of information came from those entities associated
with AEC or defense contracts and was thus not nearly as objective as most believed.38 Alarmed
when the AEC began to lose its momentum in quelling the storm, industrialists and scientists
jumped into the fray.39 In doing so, scientists from universities and laboratories rationalized the
hazards from fallout with the same national defense arguments and anti-communistic rhetoric as
the AEC, but they also argued that the risks from fallout were negligible when balanced against
common risks to health. One ambitious report from Harlan B. Jones with the University of
California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley reported that although fallout had a “deleterious
effect upon man’s health” it was small compared to the “life-span loss per person,” figured in
days, caused by smoking, being 25 percent overweight, having 25 percent elevated lipoproteins,
driving an automobile, or working in industry.40
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background radiation made fallout seem innocuous by comparison.41

And yet, even those

making the arguments could not have failed to recognize an important distinction: human beings
who smoke, eat food that will raise their lipoproteins, drive a car, or work in industry make a
conscious choice to do so—only a very few had an opportunity to escape fallout.42 Additionally,
human beings live in equilibrium with background radiation—comparisons of environmental
sources of radiation with radiation from fallout fail to address the fact fallout was an additional,
and thus potentially harmful, burden.
The AEC attempted to negate the public response to the growing evidence of
radiobiologic hazards with appeals to patriotism or, sometimes, by claiming that outside
researchers had based their studies on incomplete information.

Predictably, however, they

primarily tried to avoid the issue altogether for fear, as with adverse reports of genetic damage,
that they might be “making any statement that the newspapers could pick up as a matter of
disagreement between the AEC and a scientific paper.”43 Instead, they reminded the public of
the crucial relationship between atomic testing and national security. Within the organization
itself, however, commissioners’ requests for information were sometimes not satisfied with trite
justifications. A top-secret response to one such request evidences not only the customary
disregard for civilians and the hazards they faced from military testing; but also, and more
disturbing, stereotypical prejudices the Division of Biology and Medicine harbored against some
“Milk Production and the Age of Fallout” under a letterhead that emphasized the laboratory’s relationship with the
University of California. “Advance Copy: Hold For Release: June 27, 1957) Document No. 113982, EOL.
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of those “downwinders.”

In response to a National Academy of Sciences report that

recommended a more restrictive radiation exposure standard, members of the Division disagreed.
They quibbled with NAS's unclear definitions for “individual persons” and “general population,”
and argued that the entire problem might be irrelevant because:
The numbers of people involved around the Nevada Test Site might not constitute
a “general population” yet it probably would be difficult to categorize many
thousands of people as “individual persons.” Further, there is in a sense
‘inbreeding’ within this population.44
This military usurpation of AEC was indicative of a larger pattern of militarization in the
early years of the cold war, and one example suggests it caused a slippage of the president’s
authority as well

By November 1952, the military’s stature had risen so dramatically that the

JCS had begun to control the terms of NSC policy reviews, disabling not only other members of
the council, but also the president himself. A memorandum detailing for President Truman the
126th meeting of the NSC reflects that the NSC had agreed to recommendations from General
Walter B. Smith, director of the CIA, and other NSC committees that the NSC begin a “project
to provide a more adequate basis for planning for the security of the United States.” As
envisioned, the endeavor would include an across-the-board review of all civilian and military
components pertaining to national security and result in the compilation of “Commander’s
Estimates” for use by the president and NSC should emergency deployment become necessary.
Though undefined (at least as declassified) it can be inferred from the memorandum’s context
that the information included in these estimates would include a complete inventory of military
resources, together with their location and other information that might be necessary. The JCS
and the secretaries of the armed forces conditionally agreed to the review, but only if they alone
were allowed to undertake the “project.” Smith commented “with all deference to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,” that the review required not only military, but civilian-type information as well,
and that NSC staff could accumulate the necessary information from all agencies, including the
armed forces. Truman asked for comment on what he conceded was a “controversial” subject
and most, including General Omar Bradley, agreed that the estimates required more than the
44
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military alone could provide. The JCS then refused to cooperate because “such evaluations. .
.involved the war plans of the United States,” except insofar as the JCS agreed to provide “oral
presentations on the problem to whatever group of the National Security Council it was
determined should receive such information.” Truman could have, of course, demanded that the
military provide the required information—if only to him—but he failed to confront the JCS,
suggesting only that the NSC set up an ad hoc committee to address the problem of how the
military information might be incorporated into a strategic summary.45
Truman’s tenure was coming to an end, so it was perhaps reasonable for him not to have
pushed the JCS into a comprehensive study that might not have been useful to Eisenhower.
Nevertheless, it seems quite contrary to the constitutional chain of command, and to the intent of
the National Security Act, for the JCS to have flatly refused to provide even an “eyes-only”
written inventory of its resources. Clearly, and although Smith’s recommendation is unavailable,
the estimates he suggested would have been far too comprehensive to be delivered orally. Like
children who cling to the hope that the “right” question will not be asked, the Joint Chiefs and/or
the secretaries obviously intended to withhold information by providing oral answers to
questions posed—leaving it to their interrogator to guess at what they might have up their
respective sleeves.
The armed forces had come to view their entitlement and mission as so grandiose as to
absolve them from responsibility for their peacetime, constitutional, duties--both to their
commander-in-chief, and to the citizens they were to protect. The necessity to guard the nation
from the real enemy, the USSR, led the military to view with suspicion and regard with
animosity anyone who might learn their secrets or, through public opinion, begin to thwart their
ability to amass their self-determined necessities. Perhaps as much as the USSR, the armed
forces came to fear American citizens. And they had good reason for, as Hogan points out, the
“most important constraints on the national security state were those built into the country’s
democratic institutions and political culture.”46
IV.

45
46

(Dis)Armament

“Memorandum for the President” November 28, 1952, MNSC
Hogan, Cross, 475.

50
We will match the USSR in honest balanced reduction of armaments or we will
outmatch them in military strength.
Harry S. Truman, 195147
In late December 1950, one month before Dean Acheson advised Truman to proceed with
the hydrogen bomb, he told David Lilienthal that if the US military policy remained resistant to
international arms control and the nation’s leaders continued to declare their backing for such
control, then America would be committing “a fraud upon ourselves.”

Lilienthal agreed,

concluding that the government would end up “in the soup.”48 It might be surmised that
Lilienthal used the common American colloquialism to sum up his view that the contradictory
behavior would lead to budgetary or political problems down the road. It is possible, however,
that Lilienthal feared a more devastating reality. Highly critical of unnecessary secrecy and, as
AEC chairman, also always extraordinarily careful to protect national security, Lilienthal used
coded language in conversation and in his diary entries. In connection with the hydrogen
bomb—the “Super”—Lilienthal routinely substituted “Campbell,” “Campbell’s Soup,” or simply
“soup.” Thus, it may have been that the phrase “in the soup,” for the eloquent and articulate man
who abhorred the use of atomic science for weapons development, encapsulated his calculated
fear that the nation was headed for atomic or nuclear catastrophe.
The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to the UN’s disarmament
and international atomic energy agency resolutions must rank among the most tragic “lost
causes” of the twentieth century. Because there were no meaningful attempts to settle both
issues, atomic and hydrogen bombs became common currency in struggles for national security
and symbolic capital in the market of international prestige.

Thus, as nuclear weapons

proliferated, so too did nuclear demonstrations.49 Those who came to bear the burden, though,
began to do so only after the symbols disappeared. When the smoke cleared from these raw
displays of might, radioactivity circled the globe and descended without notice upon many who
cared not one whit about the number of planes that flew over the Kremlin on May Day or over
Washington on Independence Day. The monumental exhibitions of state power hid minutiae that
ranged from the resourceful to the grotesque: Soviet physicists learned the secrets of the United
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States’ first hydrogen bomb by collecting snow in cardboard boxes during the same year that a
US laboratory smuggled the bones of dead children from third-world countries into the States to
chronicle, but (apparently) not consciously consider, the distribution of Strontium 90.50 The
militarization of both nations pursued its own logic before which the combined weight of the UN
General Assembly and the energy and efforts of well-meaning individuals were unable to slow
its gathering momentum.
Indirectly, however, the UN resolutions, by focusing international attention on the
mounting tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to the only real
compromise reached during the 1950s—the 1958 unofficial moratorium on nuclear testing.
Setting aside the expenditure of resources caused by nuclear proliferation, fallout was its main
consequence and it was international attention provoked by the fallout problem and a consequent
Soviet challenge that, in 1958, finally led Eisenhower to agree to a temporary moratorium on
nuclear testing. Before addressing that moratorium, however, it will be useful to summarize how
the cumulative effect of multiple but interrelated circumstances prevented any meaningful
progress on the UN’s pleas.
Prior to the moratorium, the United States held an atomic advantage over the Soviet
Union and relied upon the bomb as a backup should negotiations fail. It was from this confident
position that US negotiators—for Truman and Eisenhower—went to the table unwilling to make
meaningful concessions.51 Additionally, the rhetoric designed to support both administrations’
goals brought national security to the forefront and the inflated public fears, making the issue a
useful political tool for congressmen and their influential supporters. Bolstered by seeminglylimitless budgets and the ability to wield enormous political leverage from the country’s
insecurities, the JCS resisted every initiative for arms limitation or reduction. In doing so, the
armed forces took the issue from the NSC chambers to the public, relying upon the lobbying
efforts of those, like Ernest Lawrence, who had everything to gain from continued escalation.
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US Ambassador Cohen made the initial proposal for disarmament before the UN General
Assembly during the fall of 1951; yet, throughout the decade, the United States remained as
recalcitrant as the Soviet Union toward agreeing to the resulting Joint Resolution. As thenSecretary of State Dean Acheson explained to a committee in 1952, he had hoped the proposal
would give the nation an advantage in world opinion over the Soviets.52 It did not. Instead, the
Soviets used the same forum to blame America for relying too heavily upon the superiority of its
weapons, arguing that it had blocked all reasonable attempts to develop workable solutions. As
Eisenhower said later, US policy was increasingly being made on the basis of world opinion as
shaped by Soviet declarations.53
Anti-communism was a useful tool for presidents and policymakers, but during the early
years of the cold war it became so effective that those who had used it to good effect may have
regretted that they did so. By setting up the “domino theory” the Truman Doctrine absorbed
funds that Truman would have better put to use for social programs.54 Likewise, Eisenhower’s
pre-election accusations that Truman had “bungled us perilously close to World War III”
thwarted his attempts to balance the budget.55

Korea was the springboard—hefty defense

contracts, especially in the West, left local boosters and politicians envisioning only growth, not
reduction, as the war ended. By the end of Eisenhower’s first year in office, three-quarters of the
US budget was consumed in the interests of national security and one-third of the nation’s
business relied on the defense industry.56
Such domestic extremes had an international effect that bore directly on arms control.
Though an effective stimulant for growth, anti-communist rhetoric had a negative effect on the
ways that European allies and others perceived the United States. Because of this, the support
that Truman and Eisenhower expected in response to their persistent attempts to discredit the
communists in the international community failed to emerge. In its 1953 annual report to the
president, the Psychological Board reported that Western Europe had become heavily, and
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increasingly, critical of US foreign policy. Europeans feared a trend toward “isolationism” based
upon intensified polarization between the America and the Soviets; and, additionally, decried the
United State’s anti-communist “hysteria.” By contrast, the Soviet’s “peace initiatives” seemed
more rationally motivated.57 The accuracy of the Psychology Board’s report was validated in
1956 when the United Kingdom and France expressed their discomfort with their tense
geographical position between two atom-rattling giants. During UN disarmament negotiations,
the two nations refused to join in the US proposal, submitting instead a joint “working paper” of
their own that synthesized the American and Soviet proposals.58 Tough talk had backfired, and
when it caused the nation’s two most important NATO allies to publicly separate themselves
from the American position, it only strengthened Soviet resolve and prestige.
The differences between Truman and Eisenhower on the use of atomic weaponry affected
the shape of their diplomatic strategies and goals. Alike in terms of the ways each expressed
anti-Soviet sentiments—fanning domestic anticommunism, failing to genuinely participate in the
formation of an International Atomic Energy Agency or in negotiations for arms reduction—the
two administrations held fundamentally different views with regard to the use of atomic
weapons. As has already been noted, while the NSC allowed for the coordination and continuity
of national security policy, it also easily accommodated the changing emphasis of different
administrations. Although there is evidence that by 1952 Truman had considered threatening the
Soviet Union with atomic bombardment over Korea, serious consideration of the use of atomic
weapons was not brought before the NSC during his term in office.59 Publicly, too, Truman was
essentially noncommittal and when asked, refused only to say that he would not rule out their
use.60 Long convinced that communists were not persuaded with subtlety, Eisenhower escalated
atomic weaponry from the realm of theoretical possibility to a potentiality. At a February 11,
1953, meeting of the NSC convened to consider a UN proposed strike against the Chinese at
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Kaesong, Eisenhower was unequivocal:

“We should consider the use of tactical atomic

weapons.” Dulles agreed, and while the Pentagon began to assess the danger to friendly forces
and consider other targets, the NSC Planning Board developed “contingency plans” for the end
of the war.61
Within the context of this analysis, Eisenhower’s official
atomic weapons had a paradoxical effect upon arms negotiations.

“conventionalization” of
On the one hand, the

ideological transfer62 of atomic weapons into the regular arsenal routinized them and devalued
any moral or ethical qualms that might have persisted regarding the use of weapons of mass
destruction. In this way, they strengthened the hand of US negotiators who relied upon, and
insisted upon the maintenance of, logistical and numerical superiority.63 On the other, this
devaluation of the meaning of atomic weaponry infected nuclear weapons as well, and the
frightening potential of conventional hydrogen weapons escalated the importance of a diplomatic
solution to the arms race.64 With the development of the Soviet hydrogen weapon in 1954 and
thus near parity, agreement became feasible and even more necessary. Verification of the terms,
however—proof of arms reduction, amounts of stored radioactive material, and even troop force
levels—remained a barrier.
Despite mounting tensions, and increasing willingness on behalf of the State Department
to reach some, however meager, rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the military repeatedly
refused to consider any plan. In 1954, the JCS opposed a Department of State “working group”
proposal for disarmament because it was based on an “invalid” conclusion that disarmament was
“feasible” and “in the U.S. interest.” In a comprehensive breakdown of DOD disagreements
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with State’s proposals, the JCS agreed with only one other submitting agency, the AEC. The
AEC had considered verification of the Soviet atomic stockpile an “impossibility.”65 Again, on
June 27 and June 28, 1955, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense objected to a proposal for
disarmament.66

In response, Harold E. Stassen (special assistant to the president for

disarmament) gathered the JCS together to inform them that their refusal to agree to any
discussion of disarmament absent a solution to the “world’s political problems” was entirely
unrealistic.67
All of the debates concerning disarmament took place against the backdrop of mounting
concern about fallout from hydrogen weapons.

Fallout could no longer be ignored—nor

separated from the issue of disarmament—after the detonation of “Bravo” in March 1954 caused
the death of a Japanese fisherman aboard the Lucky Dragon, radiation burns and illnesses to
others on the ship, the emergency evacuation (after a two-day delay) of a nearby island, and the
pollution of a substantial region of Japanese fishing waters.68 Fallout not only became part of the
civilian discourse on disarmament, it began to permeate the NSC chambers as well. In a
November 1955 meeting concerned with a proposed change from 1961 to 1957 as the date when
the Soviets might reasonably be expected to achieve equality with the US in terms of arms, AEC
Chairman Strauss based his approval for the change on the Soviet’s success with its accelerated
nuclear program.

The JCS’s Admiral Radford qualified Strauss’s mention of the Soviet

achievement with reference to the hazards involved in nuclear testing, if not specifically to the
“Bravo” incident: “of course the Russians cared nothing whatever about accidents. We [have]
to be careful of human life and accordingly more careful in our testing.”69
Once the dangers of fallout began to circulate throughout the media, the reality of arms
escalation caused a shift in the terms of the debate over disarmament. Congressional hearings,
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prompted in part by accusations of negligence and deception on behalf of the AEC and concern
over the military’s continued growth, forced the AEC and the DOD to rely in 1957 upon industry
contacts for support. Edward Teller tried to quell the growing fears, but ended up causing some
confusion among insiders and congressmen with his promises of a “clean” bomb that he claimed
was already in the works.70 Teller’s unfounded comments regarding a fallout-free bomb took
Ernest Lawrence, his boss, by surprise. Drawing attention away from Teller’s startling remarks,
Lawrence de-emphasized the “clean” bomb concept, focusing during the hearings and in a
meeting with Eisenhower on the importance of nuclear progress to national security. The
congratulatory mail he received from the AEC upon his return to California evidences the
incestuous relationship between the commission, the military, and (at least one) influential
industrialist. Strauss’s special assistant, J.H. Morse, Jr. (Captain, USN) gushed:
Everything has gone beautifully. Most important for all is the President’s
mental approach, vitally altered by the fact that for the first time he sees
real reason for continued tests. . .he is not likely to accede to deceptive
Russian offers to stop. . . Furthermore, Congress will not accede if the
President does.71
Paul A. Foster, Assistant General Manager for AEC International Activities, drew allusions to
1920s pacifists and “women’s group clubs” who had been swayed by British and Japanese
propaganda before praising Lawrence. “I devoutly wish that our national leaders preached less
about the horrors of war and more about the horrors of defeat at the hands of a cunning and
Godless Communism.”72
In the end, it was a “Godless” communist who figured out a way to end the proliferation
of, at least, Strontium 90, within the atmosphere. By 1958, fallout had become an increasingly
important political issue, domestically and internationally. It added potency to the arguments of
those who favored disarmament, and competing articles in popular journals by prominent
scientists coupled the two issues, bringing them to the forefront together.

While Teller’s

personal motivations cannot be known, he based his pronouncement of objection to disarmament
in a Foreign Affairs article on the inadequacy of any possible system of verification even as
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Nobel Prize winning physicist Isidor Rabi publicly voiced his opinion that inspection and
verifiability were scientifically possible, especially given the enormous stakes involved in
continued escalation.

The sharp distinction between these two positions also divided

Eisenhower’s advisors in the NSC.

Strauss favored Teller’s position, but Eisenhower’s

disarmament specialist Harold Stassen believed Rabi correct. The division prompted Eisenhower
to reconsider his original position and the NSC to order the first study on “losses consequent” to
a “total suspension of nuclear tests” since the beginning of the atomic age.73

Mounting

international pressure to address in some meaningful way the problems posed by fallout from
nuclear weapons exerted just enough leverage to push Eisenhower and Khruschev to agreement.
On April 4, 1958, Khruschev publicly announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally cease
testing nuclear and atomic weapons while waiting for agreement on the UN Resolution. Four
days later, on April 8, 1958, Eisenhower agreed that the US would cooperate in an unofficial
moratorium.74
been possible without so much hardship. If successful, this essay has illustrated that it might have been.

V.

Conclusion
There is an ominous trend in this nation. . . . The drift goes
back, I think, to the fact that we carried over to days of peace
the military approach to world affairs.
Justice William O. Douglas, January 13, 195275
When Dulles met with his committee on disarmament to discuss the upcoming agreement

to cease testing, General Alfred M. Gruenther told him that the AEC had opposed the agreement
because they were “just beginning to tap possible new developments for testing in higher
latitudes.” To Dulles, Gruenther dismissed their opposition, saying that he believed there was
not much “glitter” on the AEC promise.76
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At the end of his splendid critique of the post-war national security state, Michael J.
Hogan asks if US victory in the cold war might have been gained at less cost.77 As a component
of the cold war, it is worth considering, too, whether atomic and nuclear superiority, or even
satisfactory stability, might have Civilian control dissolved with Lilienthal’s departure and
militarism drove atomic weapons development ever forward toward the “glitter” that Gruenther
wisely counseled was but a spectre of something perhaps more terrifying. Along the way,
accelerated development and testing schedules fostered reckless, even criminal behavior.
Scientists camouflaged their biases behind reams of data that reached illogical conclusions and
Lewis Strauss, as Chairman of the AEC, argued before Congress that the radiation burns on the
skin of a dying Japanese fisherman had not resulted from fallout, but from a combination of poor
diet and sunburn. Many can be named and blamed; but there is no room here, nor is there within
the business of history, for wholesale condemnation. Many, many others played a sincere role in
the machinery of the cold war. They did their duty, just as Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, who
served as Strategic Air Commander for the US Air Force. Looking back now, Edmundson
remembered that fears of a surprise Soviet attack were so persistent that SAC remained on
continual atomic alert for years, but “We couldn’t think of any other way to keep it from
happening.”78
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As recorded in the PBS documentary, Race for the Superbomb.

